In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
Introduction
Environmental protection is a priority and a challenge in many countries. Economic activity generates negative external effects that producers do not internalize. Taxes and standards are the common policy instruments to regulate the environmental quality. The traditional approach to discuss the optimal environmental policy has been to assume that polluters comply with the environmental regulation. However, firms' compliance is not guarantied. To be fully effective, information on the firms' characteristics and behavior is necessary for the implementation of taxes and standards.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal audit policy in a situation where firms may evade environmental taxes. We analyze the effects of the possibility of evasion (combined with the optimal auditing policy) on the level of environmental emissions of a population of firms. We also study how the optimal policy varies with the characteristics of the firms. 1 We follow some recent environmental policy literature that has incorporated compliance issues. 2 We assume that the tax policy is not perfectly enforceable; in particular we consider that environmental taxes may be evaded by under-reporting emissions. This becomes possible when government monitoring is imperfect because firms cannot be monitored with high probability (it is costly), or because even when monitored, the true level of emissions of a firm is difficult to identify. Inspection policies combined with sanctions provide a key tool on the provision of incentives to reduce environmental deviations.
Cropper & Oates (1992) define two types of environmental problems that may give raise to different environmental violations. First, pollution may be the issue of an accident:
be a negligence or a random act of nature. This type of problem is not considered in our paper. Second, a firm may intentionally violate the law by not complying with a regulatory standard, or by not paying the appropriate emission taxes. That is the type of violation that we analyze in this paper. In addition, we make an important distinction between the 1 We concentrate in emission taxes because they have the virtue that, face to the same emission tax, marginal emission benefits (or marginal abatement costs) are equal across firms. 2 The compliance issue based on monitoring (or inspections) and fines is of general interest in many fields. For a general review of the compliance literature see Polinsky & Shavell (2000) . For environmental problems see Cohen (1999) .
emission level and the taxes paid by a firm. Firms explicitly choose an emission -report combination and they may comply better or worse with the environmental target than with the tax obligation.
We first analyze the impact of the audit policy on an individual firm. The audit policy has a deterrence effect on both the firm's actual level of emission and its reported emission. When the firm does not fear any inspection, then it pollutes freely, while it also reports not to have polluted at all. When faced with a positive (but small) audit pressure, the firm decreases its emission level, and continues to report not to have polluted. It is only when the audit pressure is strong that the firm begins reporting more truthfully its actual level of emission. Hence, initially, auditing has much a stronger deterrence effect on the emission decisions than on the reporting of them. We claim this characteristic of the firm's behavior facing audits is good news. In particular, it has been extensively argued that pollution taxes should be considered for their environmental effects not for their revenue potential.
Second, we consider the optimal policy when the enforcement agency faces a population of firms with different characteristics. We develop the analysis under the assumption that the only objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize the level of emissions, as rising revenue is not an issue for the agency. We show that when firms differ in the effectiveness of the audit (some are more difficult to detect than others), then it is optimal to go first after the firms easy to audit. As the budget for audit increases, more firms will be monitored, while the audit intensity on inspected firms increases. We also analyze the case where firms differ in the private gains from emissions. In this case, the optimal enforcement policy biases its strength against those firms that value pollution less.
We show that, as it is expected, an increase in the budget (more monitoring) will induce pollution to fall. However, unless the enforcement agency's budget is very large, it will allocate its auditing effort among the firms in such a way that all of them will report not to have polluted. That is, an increase in the budget will not induce a raise in compliance with environmental taxes. We want to highlight the importance of this distinction: There are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective, and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
Our result seems to be at odds with a well-established result by Harford (1978) . This author concludes that "the actual waste level of the firm does not directly depend upon the size of the fine or the probability of discovery of the violation." That is, increases in the budget would lead to more compliance with the taxes, but not to lower emission levels. This result was obtained from the analysis of the interior solution of the compliance decision of a single firm. Harford (1978) also studied the corner solutions and argued that the interior solution is the sensible one. Our analysis points out that when the enforcement agency decides upon the distribution of the auditing intensity in a population of firms, it often allocates its limited resources in a manner where firms do not behave as described by Harford (1978) . 3 There is increasing literature on environmental regulations and more recently on the enforcement issue. 4 Harford (1987), Kaplow & Shavell (1994) , and Innes (1999), among others, have also considered self-reporting as an important element in enforcement policies.
They show that self-reporting combined with an audit strategy increases compliance. Cohen, 2000) . They provide evidence on the fact that both inspection and threat of an inspection are useful to reduce pollution emission .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the firm's decision on both the emission level and the payment of taxes. Section 3 analyzes the optimal policy when there is a population of heterogenous firms that differ in their opportunities to evade; while in Section 4, we consider that firms differ in the gains of pollution.
In Sector 5, we discuss on the generality of the results, and Section 6 concludes. Finally, an Appendix includes all the proofs.
The Model and the Firm's decision
In this section, we present the basic model and consider the decision of a single competitive firm. For the purpose of our model, we concentrate on the decision of the firm concerning its true and reported level of emission. We use a generalization of the framework used for example by Sandmo (2002).
The firm chooses the level of emission e, where e ∈ [0, E]. Hence, E is the emission level of the firm when pollution is free. The firm's benefits from emission e are represented by the function λg(e), with λ > 0, and g(.) increasing and concave: g 0 (e) > 0 and g 00 (e) ≤ 0.
Also, we assume for simplicity that g 0 (0) = +∞ and g 0 (E) = 0, so that a small level of emission has a big marginal impact on the firm's profits, while the marginal profits at very high emission levels are very small. Parameter λ introduces a simple way to parametrize the gains of the firm (usually due to cost reduction) when polluting. A firm with higher λ is a firm whose private benefits from polluting are higher.
In order to control pollution, emissions are taxed at rate t > 0. We consider that t is exogenously given; it is set by the government. It may be equal to the marginal social damages of emissions evaluated at the social optimum, taking into account the problem of enforcement.
Under environmental taxes, the profits of a firm with parameter λ that produces a level of emissions e and pays the taxes corresponding to e (i.e., there is perfect monitoring of emissions) are:
We denote by e * λ = e * (λ) the optimal level of emissions under perfect monitoring for a firm with parameter λ. The level e
If the level of emissions is not perfectly monitorable cost free, then the auditing strategy of the enforcement agency and the reporting strategy of the firm (in addition to its emission strategy) are strategic decisions. We denote by α the probability that the enforcement agency will audit the emissions of the firm. 5 However, α is not necessarily the probability that an evasion is caught, since an audit does not always allow to uncover the firm's true level of emissions. The probability that the true emission level of the firm is identified through an audit is ρ ∈ [0, 1] . Parameter ρ may be understood as the difficulty to detect a violation or to have strong evidence that allows to sanction the firm.
Some pollutants persist in the environment longer than others; some can be more exactly assigned to the activity of a particular firm than others. The parameter ρ reflects these differences. A firm with a lower ρ is a firm that has more room for evading, since its emissions are harder to identify when audited.
The firm may choose a report z that does not coincide with the true emission level e. A firm never reports a higher emission level than the real one (since it involves paying higher taxes), so z ≤ e. When it reports a level of emission inferior to the real one -if it is audited and its true emission level is identified-, then in addition to paying the evaded taxes, a penalty is imposed to the firm. This penalty takes the form of the function θ(e − z), increasing and convex in the level of evasion: θ(0) = 0, θ 0 (x) > 0 and θ 00 (x) > 0 for x > 0. 6 Therefore, the expected profits of a firm with parameters (λ, ρ) facing an audit prob- 5 By now, we consider that the probability of being audited is independent of the report made by the firm. We think this is a sensible hypothesis. Moreover, in Section 5, we will show that restricting attention to this class of policy is without loss of generality in many scenarios. 6 The penalty may be monetary or not. For example, in Canada, a list of firms that either do not comply with the existing regulation or whose environmental performance is of concern, is anually published.
Both the community and the market act on it (see e.g., Lanoi et al. 1998 , for evidence on this aspect).
Community pressure and other forms of informal sanction have been explored, for example, by Brooks & Sethi (1997) . Penalties may also include the costs for cleaning-up violations of the environmental regulation that responsible firms must pay.
7 ability α, when it chooses an emission level e, and it reports z, can be written as:
The firm chooses the optimal levels e o and z o in order to maximize the expected profits (1) . If the solution is interior, the first-order conditions are:
The next proposition establishes the optimal behavior of the firm:
Proposition 1 For a given tax rate t, audit probability α, and penalty function θ(.), the optimal emission and report decisions (e o , z o ) for the firm with parameters (λ, ρ) are:
then e o ∈ (e * λ , E) as defined by (4) and z o = 0, with
as defined by (5) :
The solution in terms of emissions and reports as a function of the audit probability α (for a firm that is caught with probability ρ) is illustrated in Figure 1 .
it may be the case that Region (d) in Figure 1 , does not exist. This happens when 
, ρ is very low. Note, also, that the limits of the regions separating the interior and the corner solutions do not depend on g(.), but they depend on λ via e * λ . Finally, if the penalty function would be linear, then θ 0 (0) = θ 0 (e * λ ), and Region (c) would vanish. 7 To help the reading of equations, throughout the paper we only use parenthesis (.) for functions, as in θ(e − z) while we use brackets [.] for multiplications, as in t[e − z], which means t times e − z. 8 Note that a similar figure can be drawn as a function of ρ for any level of α. It suffices to take into account that, for example the cut-off
Figure 1: Firm's best decision in terms of the emission level and the report.
If the firm is not subject to any audit (α = 0), or it is impossible for the agency to prove that it has polluted (ρ = 0), then the firm does not fear an inspection. Hence, it pollutes freely while claiming to be a clean firm, that is, e o = E and z o = 0. As the pressure on the firm increases (i.e., as we go from Region (a) to (b), with ρα increasing), the firm decreases its level of emissions, while still reporting that it is clean. This is an important insight from the analysis of the model: when auditing is not too frequent, it has much a stronger deterrence effect on the emissions than on the report. This result is independent of the objective function of the environmental agency, since it is derived from the analysis of the behavior of the firm. However, it is particularly good news for an agency that is (as we will assume from the next section on) mainly concerned about emissions, rather than with catching under-reporting firms.
When the audit pressure is strong, the firm chooses the "minimum" level of emission e * λ (the level that the firm would choose under perfect monitoring) and also makes a more honest report. This corresponds to Region (c), where there is an interior solution for both emissions and report. This is the case that leads Harford (1978) to reach the conclusion that emissions are not affected by the probability of auditing. 9 This is a very well-known result in the literature cited, for example, in Cohen (2000) . Region (c) is also the region analyzed in Sandmo (2002) , where the optimal emission level is obtained, even if the taxes collected are not the ones corresponding to that emission level. Finally, if the perceived audit pressure ρα is even stronger (Region (d)), the firm's decision is the same as under prefect monitoring, that is, e o = z o = e * λ . Auditing firms aims at two apparently offsetting effects: (ex-ante) deterrence and (expost) detection. Some stylized facts 10 suggest that increased monitoring (a higher α)
leads to higher detection coupled with higher deterrence. That is, the detection effect outweighs any deterrent effect. Our result is compatible with these stylized facts. Indeed, in the (possibly most relevant) Region (b), increasing α makes the firm more compliant, since it decreases its emission level. Moreover, the probability of the firm being caught increases, since it is still underreporting. 9 Harford (1978) also analyzes case (b) where reported wasted are equal to zero. He disregards this case as: "It would be irrational to set penalties so low that no pollution tax at all was collected." 10 See for example Epple & Visscher (1984) and Cohen (2000) .
Finally, we state (without its easy proof) a corollary with the comparative statics of the optimal firm's emission, and report with respect to the different parameters.
Corollary 1 (i) The optimal firm's emissions e o are increasing in λ and decreasing in t when ρα > 0. Moreover, e o is non-increasing in α and ρ.
(ii) The optimal firm's report z o is non-decreasing in α, ρ, and λ and non-increasing in t.
Firms differ in their possibilities to evade
In this section, we consider the optimal monitoring policy for the enforcement agency when it is in charge of auditing a population of firms that are heterogeneous with respect to their opportunities to evade. That is, we assume here that all firms obtain the same benefits from polluting, and we normalize λ = 1, but the probability of uncovering evasion varies across them, that is firms differ in their parameter ρ. The population of firms, parametrized by ρ, is distributed over the interval [0, 1] , according to the density function
, whose cumulative function is F (ρ). The enforcement agency has complete information about the type of each firm and can design an audit policy that discriminates among them.
We assume that the only objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize total emissions. That is, following e.g. Garvie & Keeler (1994) , we assume that the enforcement agency does not intend to raise money. Its objective is to achieve the highest level of compliance given its enforcement budget. (A lump-sum tax on firms allows to raise money without inducing any distortion.) 11 We denote by B the budget that the agency can devote to auditing and we normalize the cost of one audit to one, so that B is the number of audits that the agency can carry out. Hence, the enforcement agency decides on the probability of auditing each type of firm, that is, it chooses (α(ρ)) ρ∈[0,1] in order 11 It has often been argued that environmental quality should be the ultimate goal of enforcement agencies (see, for example, OECD, 2001). In addition, penalties are often not monetary, as discussed in the previous section.
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to solve the following program:
where EΠ(ρ, α; e, z) are the expected profits defined in (1) for λ = 1.
As we have seen after Proposition 1, the minimum emission level that the agency can achieve from any firm is e * (we denote e * ≡ e * 1 since λ = 1 in all this section). Let us defineα
as the minimum audit probability that induces a level of emissions e * from a firm of type ρ (when α ≤α(ρ), the firm reports z = 0, the report is positive for α >α(ρ)). Note that this probability level is "feasible" only whenα(ρ) ≤ 1, i.e., ρ ≥ b ρ, where:
A firm whose parameter ρ is lower than b ρ, pollutes more than e * , even if the audit probability is α = 1, since the probability of being discovered when audited is low.
The minimum total pollution level that the agency can achieve (even with an unlimited budget) is:
where e * * (ρ) is implicitly defined by:
and e * * (0) = E. The first term in the expression for e MIN ρ measures the emissions of the firms that over-pollute even when audited with probability one, choosing e * * (ρ) > e * .
The second term adds up the pollution of the firms that may be induced to choose the level of emission e * .
What is the minimum budget that the enforcement agency needs in order to achieve
The firms whose ρ belongs to [0, b ρ], should be audited with probability α (ρ) = 1.
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On the other hand, those firms whose ρ belongs to (b ρ, 1], only need to be audited with probabilityα(ρ). Therefore, the budget necessary to achieve e MIN ρ is:
Given that the objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize emissions, the next proposition formally states an immediate consequence of the previous analysis.
Proposition 2 When B ≥ B ρ , the agency sets an audit policy involving α (ρ) = 1, for
When the budget allocated to the enforcement agency is large enough, it will set a policy to achieve the minimum total pollution level possible, e MIN ρ
. Increases in α (ρ) , with respect toα(ρ), for ρ > b ρ, do not affect the firms' level of emission, they only increase the firms' report.
In the remainder of this section, we consider situations where B < B ρ , that is, where the agency does not have resources to achieve e MIN ρ
. In this case, the agency never sets an auditing probability higher thanα(ρ) for a type-ρ firm. Indeed, if it is the case that α (ρ) >α(ρ) for some ρ, decreasing this probability and increasing the audit pressure over those firms ρ 0 for which α (ρ 0 ) <α(ρ 0 ), would lead to a reduction in the total level of emissions. This fact leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If B < B ρ , then the firm's report will be z(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] , when the enforcement agency implements the optimal auditing policy.
Proposition 3 states a result that is quite surprising at first sight: unless the agency's budget is very large (larger that B ρ ), all the firms in the economy will be reporting that they do not pollute. Understanding the result requires going back to Proposition 1. That proposition stated that increasing monitoring makes a firm first (region (b)) decrease its emissions until a minimum level e * λ , while keeping the report z o = 0. When the monitoring is strong enough so that the firm decides e * λ (region (c)), then increasing pressure only affects its reporting level, making it closer to the true emission. When the auditing agency only cares about emissions, the effect on the report is unimportant. Hence, it is not until 13 all the firms are lead to their minimum level of emissions (and this requires a budget of at least B ρ ), that the agency induces them to report more truthfully.
Before analyzing how the agency allocates the budget among the different types of firms, we comment on the allocation of resources to firms that have equal opportunities to evade. It is intuitive that the agency "should" apply the same policy to two identical firms. This is certainly the case if the optimal firm's emission is a (decreasing and) convex function of the probability of auditing. Indeed, under convexity, auditing one firm with a higher probability than other identical firms does not minimize the emission: monitoring both firms with average probability would decrease total pollution. The next assumption guaranties that the emissions are in fact a convex function of the auditing probability.
Assumption 1 The function h(x) defined below is increasing:
g 00 (e(x)) − xθ 00 (e(x)) .
Note that g 000 (.) > Max{0, θ 000 (.)} is a sufficient (although far from necessary) condition for h(x) to be increasing.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal auditing policy for budgets lower than B ρ , under Assumption 1. In particular, it shows that the auditing strategy will be biased to target the easier-to-audit firms -the ones whose emissions are easier to identify.
Corollary 2 complements the proposition stating the firms' behavior facing the optimal auditing policy.
Proposition 4 When B < B ρ , under Assumption 1, there exist ρ a (B) and ρ b (B) , with 0 < ρ a (B) < ρ b (B) ≤ 1, such that the optimal audit policy α(ρ) satisfies the following:
, with ρα(ρ) increasing in ρ, and
Corollary 2 When B < B ρ , under Assumption 1, the optimal firms' emission level e o (ρ)
facing the optimal policy is the following:
, then e(ρ) = E,
, then e o (ρ) (defined by (2) for z = 0 and α = α(ρ)) is decreasing in ρ, and , then it has incentives to discriminate among firms. The agency first targets those firms whose non-compliance is easier to verify, that is, firms with higher ρ. For the firms with the highest ρs, that is, in Region (III) (which only exists when the budget B is high enough), the agency exerts the maximum auditing pressure, leading those firms to their lowest level of emissions e * . In this region, the audit pressure α(ρ) decreases with ρ, because the easier it is to identify pollution, the lower the audit probability necessary to induce e * .
The agency also audits with some probability those firms with intermediate values of the parameter ρ, Region (II), the total perceived pressure ρα(ρ) increasing in ρ. Hence, easier-to-catch firms produce lower levels of emissions. Finally, the agency decides not to audit those firms whose pollution is very difficult to detect. All these firms will pollute as much as they want, that is e o (ρ) = E.
It is worthwhile pointing out that a similar result to Proposition 4 holds if the objective function of the enforcement agency is to minimize the budget necessary to achieve a given level of total emissions. For any level of total emissionsē that the agency would wish to implement, there exist two cut-off values, ρ a (ē) and ρ b (ē) , that define three Regions (I), (II) and (III) where the optimal audit policy follows the same pattern as in Proposition 4.
Let us concentrate now on how the audit strategy changes with the budget.
Proposition 5
The cut-off levels ρ a (B) and ρ b (B) , identified in Proposition 4, satisfy the following property: ρ a (B) is decreasing and ρ b (B) is non-increasing in B. Moreover, the optimal audit pressure α(ρ) is increasing in B, for all ρ ∈ (ρ a (B) , ρ b (B)).
Proposition 5 shows that when the budget for audit increases, more firms (from the population of firms easy to monitor) will comply with the environmental standards, and some more other firms hard to monitor will be subject to audit. Moreover, except for the firms whose audit pressure is either zero, or high enough, the audit intensity will also increase with the budget (and hence the emission level will decrease). 
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In this section, we characterize the optimal monitoring policy when firms differ in the gains from emissions. Given the similarities between this analysis and the one developed in the previous section, we concentrate here on the main result and intuitions.
We consider that the enforcement agency faces a population of firms parametrized by λ (the parameter that measures the gains of the firms), distributed over the interval £ λ, λ ¤ , 0 < λ < λ according to the density function ϕ(λ), with ϕ(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ £ λ, λ ¤ .
We consider for simplicity that the monitoring technology is perfect, i.e., ρ = 1, the qualitative results are not altered if one analyzes the situations with ρ < 1.
In Section 2, we have denoted e * λ the emission level decided by a firm with parameter λ which is subject to perfect monitoring. This is the minimum emission level that the enforcement agency can achieve through its monitoring strategy. Moreover, when ρ = 1, the firm will indeed pollute e * λ if and only if the probability of auditing is higher or equal to
, which is always smaller than 1. Hence, the minimum industry pollution level, with no constraint on the budget, is defined by:
The budget necessary to achieve e MIN λ is:
The next proposition characterizes the optimal monitoring policy:
Proposition 6 (i) When B ≥ B λ , the agency sets an audit policy involving (ii.II) For firms with λ < λ (B) , then α(λ) > 0. Firms' emission levels e o (λ) are increasing in λ.
Proposition 6 shows that when the firms differ in the gains from emissions, the agency biases its strategy against those firms that value pollution less. Having less incentives to pollute, the firms with less gains from polluting will be more deterred by the auditing, hence the monitoring will have a stronger effect on those firms. On the other hand, the agency prefers not to devote resources to firms that place strong value on emissions (i.e., firms with very high λ). For those firms, polluting is so valuable that the marginal deterrence effect of the audit is small.
A general audit policy
We have considered a model where the probability α that a firm is audited of independent on the report. We made this reasonable hypothesis because it simplifies the analysis. In general, however, the audit probability can depend not only on the firm's characteristics (ρ and λ), but also on the firm's behavior (the report z). We prove, and briefly discuss
here, a result that shows that restricting attention to policies independent of the report z is without loss of generality in many interesting cases.
We denoteα
+ t] the minimum audit probability that induces e * λ from a firm with parameters (λ, ρ).
Proposition 7
Consider a general auditing function α(z), and let z o be the optimal firm's report given α(z). Suppose that α(z o ) ≤α(ρ, λ). Then, the audit policy where the agency audits any report with probability α(z o ) is equivalent to the policy α(z).
Proposition 7 shows that, if the agency does not want to achieve emission levels below e * λ , then it can restrict attention to policies where the audit probability does not depend on the report. The agency cannot achieve a better result through more general audit policies. Note that, if the tax rate t is optimally designed, e * λ is the optimal emission level from a social point of view. On the other hand, if the tax rate is not optimal, and the agency can credibly use sophisticated auditing schemes with audit probabilities depending on the firm's report, then it may have incentives to propose different audit functions than the ones we use.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have aimed at better understanding the role of environmental monitoring on firms' emission decisions and firms' tax compliance behavior. Our results predict that, when facing a population of heterogenous firms, the enforcement agency will focus on the "easier" enforcement targets: easier-to-detect firms and those firms that value pollution less. Hence, the results allow to explain why some firms and/or some industries are more monitored than others. This conclusion is in accordance with stylized facts. Moreover, we have also shown that the optimal auditing policy may very well lead to a reasonable level of emission, coupled with a very high level of environmental tax evasion.
In our model, we abstract from many interesting elements of the environmental enforcement problem that are complementary to our analysis. Let us briefly comment on some of them.
We concentrate on the enforcement aspect of the environmental problem, and we do not address the question on how environmental taxes and the enforcement agency's budget are decided. These tools may be the choice of the central authority, who may consider social welfare or political interest in the decision-making process. In our model, the enforcement agency maximizes compliance with the environmental target. The general environmental policy will be decided at an earlier stage.
We assume that sanctions are costless to the enforcement agency. In fact, one may argue that prosecuting and enforcing the payment of fines may be costly for the regulator.
This aspect may reduce the agency interest in enforcing the environmental target, but will not change the nature of our results. We also assume that all the participants are risk-neutral. Risk aversion, or wealth constraints, may be important in some cases. In particular, bankruptcy and insolvency are problems that should be taken into account.
However, we have argued that penalties are often non monetary (incarceration, reputation, firm's image, etc.).
In our model, the probability of inspection is endogenous (and contingent to the firm's wastes report). However, we do not consider the possibility that the probability of being inspected increases with the level of emissions of a firm. It may be the case that the firm's emission level may attract the attention of the environment agency via some kind of signal so that the probability of being audited increases with the level of evasion. Prior information in environmental enforcement has been considered by several authors. Harford (1978) assumes that the exogenous probability of auditing is an increasing function of the wastes emissions. Heyes (2002) Finally, we have adopted the principal -agent approach. Hence, we have assumed perfect commitment (that often is justified based on the reputation concern of the enforcement agency). This is the most common approach. In fact, this is the most optimistic one, since it is the best scenario for enforcement issues. Some authors have recently considered the enforcement problem (monitoring and emission strategies) as the sequential equilibrium outcome of a game, where the enforcement agency has no-commmitment capacity (see for instance Franckx, 2002 ).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we check the second-order conditions:
00 (e − z) < 0, and
The emission level e o maximizing (1) is always strictly positive. Also, it is strictly lower than the maximum level E if and only if ρα > 0. If ρα = 0, that is, we are in region (a), then it is easy to check that the firm chooses e o = E and z o = 0. For the rest of the proof, we consider ρα > 0, hence e ∈ (0, E).
The report z is interior if and only if ραθ also appears when we analyze interior solutions). When both the emission level and the report are interior (region (c)), adding equations (2) and (3) we obtain λg 0 (e) = t, i.e.,
The optimal report in this region z o is defined by (3) for e = e * λ , that is, it is given by equation (5).
Proof of Proposition 4. We start the proof by stating and proving two lemmas. Lemma 1. The enforcement agency audits two firms with the same probability.
Proof Lemma 1. Denote α 1 and α 2 the probabilities of auditing identical firms 1 and 2 with equal parameter ρ. First, when min{α 1 ,α 2 }≥α(ρ), the enforcement agency achieves the best possible outcome, since e 1 = e 2 = e * . No reallocation of resources among those firms are possible. But since B < B ρ , no probability can be higher than α(ρ), hence α 1 = α 2 =α(ρ). Second, in region (b) of Proposition 1, where α <α(ρ) and e o < e * , it is easy to check that the first derivative of e o with respect to α is ρh(ρα).
Therefore, e o is a convex function of α since h(x) is increasing. Auditing one firm with a probability α 1 lower than α 2 does not minimize the emission: a monitoring probability equal to (α 1 + α 2 )/2 applied to both firms would result in lower total emissions e 1 + e 2 .
Lemma 2. The emission levels e 1 and e 2 of two firms with parameters ρ 1 and ρ 2 satisfy e 1 ≥ e 2 if and only if ρ 1 α 1 ≤ ρ 2 α 2 . Also, e 1 > e 2 if and only if ρ 1 α 1 < ρ 2 α 2 and
then e 2 = e * < e 1 . Third, let us assume that ρ 2 α 2 < b ρ. Take equation (2) for
. This equation defines a negative relationship between e and ρα since g(.) is concave and θ(.) is convex. Finally, it is easy to check that the conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4, let us consider two firms, 1 and 2, such that ρ 1 < ρ 2 . Denoting α i = α(ρ i ) and e i = e o (ρ i ), for i = 1, 2, we prove that ρ 1 α 1 ≤ ρ 2 α 2 .
In the following argument, we assume α 1 ∈ (0,α(ρ 1 )], α 2 <α(ρ 2 ) (and also α 2 < 1).
Suppose by contradiction that ρ 1 α 1 > ρ 2 α 2 and consider a decrease in α 1 by δ > 0 (δ small enough) that induces a saving of f (ρ 1 )δ in auditing costs, and an increase in α 2 , financed through this saving. This implies an increase in α 2 equal to
δ. The change in the total level of emissions after this reallocation of budget is (notice that the marginal effects take place in region (b) of Proposition 1):
Since h(x) is increasing, h(ρ 1 α 1 ) > h(ρ 2 α 2 ), both expressions being negative. Therefore,
] < 0 and total emissions decrease after the reallocation of the budget previously proposed. Therefore, setting α 1 and α 2 such that ρ 1 α 1 > ρ 2 α 2 cannot be optimal. (c) The previous argument also implies that α 2 =α(ρ 2 ) whenever α 1 <α(ρ 1 ). Notice in addition that when B is large enough (but still smaller than B ρ ), there exists a value ρ b (B) < 1 that does separate regions (b) and (c). The reason is that the following limit:
is decreasing in ρ. Hence, as ρ increases, the marginal effect of an increase in α as it approachesα(ρ) is more negative.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We first notice, after Proposition 4, that the optimal audit policy for a particular B is easily characterized once we know α(ρ o ) for any ρ o for
The value b x(ρ) is well defined because h() is an increasing function. Take x(ρ) =
Min {b x(ρ), ρα(ρ)} . Then, it is easy to check that the optimal policy is α (ρ) = x(ρ)/ρ.
Hence, α(ρ) is weakly increasing in α(ρ o ). In other words, when a particular ρ = ρ o is audited more regularly, no other ρ can be audited with less probability. Consequently, the level of emissions e(ρ) is also a weakly increasing function in e(α(ρ o )). A higher B must imply the increase in the audit probability of at least one type-ρ firm, and by the previous argument no firm may be now under a lower audit pressure. Hence, a higher B leads to a lower ρ a and ρ b . Moreover, the audit intensity increases for all firms that are not at a corner solution.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) is trivial since B ≥ B λ allows to set a policy
, which leads to the best possible outcome for the agency.
For part (ii), we first claim that, by the same reasons as in Proposition 3, when
and it induces all firms to report zero. That is, the policy lies in regions (a) or (b) of Proposition 1. Second, consider two
)+t ] . We analyze the consequences of a decrease in α(λ 1 ) by δ > 0 (δ small enough) that induces a saving of ϕ(λ 1 )δ in auditing costs, and an increase in α(λ 2 ) financed with this amount. This implies an increase in α(λ 2 ) equal to
δ. The change in the total level of emissions after this reallocation of budget is (note that the relevant marginal effects happen in region (b) of Proposition 1):
We show that at the optimal auditing policy,
. Suppose it is not the case, i.e.,
. Since h(x) is increasing then h
both numbers being negative. Therefore, −
0, which implies that total emissions decrease after the reallocation of the budget. , then e o (λ) = e * λ in this region, which is an increasing function of λ. When the solution is interior, we know that
when λ 1 > λ 2 . We claim that this implies that e o (λ 1 ) > e o (λ 2 ). Indeed, condition (4) for ρ = 1 (that is the relevant condition in region (b)) can be rewritten as:
Hence, the emission e o is an increasing function of α/λ.
Proof of Proposition 7. First, we note that the agency can propose an equivalent audit policy to α(z), where it audits with probability 1 any report different from z o , and with probability α(z o ) the report z o . Facing this policy, it is easy to check that the firm will still decide to report z o : its expected profits by reporting z o do not change, while the profits in case it chooses any other report are at most the same as before. Hence the two policies involve the same final emission level and the same cost (i.e., same probability of auditing). Therefore, for the proof we can restrict attention to the set of audit functions parametrized by (α o , z o ), where α o is the probability with which the firm is audited when it reports z o , any other report is audited with certainty. Moreover, the policy must be such that the firm does choose z o .
Given the policy (α o , z o ), the optimal emission level e(z o ) by the firm is determined by condition (2), for z = z o and α = α o :
We can check that e(z o ) is a decreasing function. Therefore, the best policy that the agency can possibly implement in order to minimize the level of emissions with a budget (probability) α o involves z o = 0 and e o = e(z o = 0) implicitly defined by:
The firm will indeed choose z o = 0 if its profits are higher than its other options. Given that the other reports are audited with probability 1, the best it can do if it chooses z > 0 is reporting truthfully and polluting e = e * λ . Therefore, the policy (α o , z o = 0) is indeed implementable if and only if:
where e o is the function of α o defined in (7) . It is easy to check that Π(α o ) is decreasing in α o (also taking into account the, null, effect through e o ), and that Π(0) is larger and Π(1) smaller than λg(e * λ ) − te * λ . Finally, Π(α(ρ, λ)) > λg(e * λ ) − te * λ . Therefore, the best policy that the agency can implement with a budget α ≤α(ρ, λ) leads the firm to report z = 0 and it is equivalent to the policy where the agency audits any report with the same probability α.
